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Are stewardship and valuation usefulness  
 
compatible or alternative objectives of financial accounting? 
 
Abstract: In their joint framework project, the FASB and the IASB recently proposed 
dropping stewardship as a separate objective of financial accounting, because the Boards 
view stewardship and valuation usefulness as compatible sub-objectives ranking under an 
overall objective of decision usefulness.  This paper puts this conjecture to an empirical 
test.  As it is widely agreed that asymmetric timely earnings increase the contractual 
efficiency of accounting information, I first test whether firms with more asymmetric 
timely earnings produce more valuation-useful financial accounting information.  Second, 
I test whether firms with more influential non-equity stakeholders provide more 
valuation-useful financial accounting information.  As non-equity stakeholders in general 
face higher transaction costs when diversifying unsystematic risk compared to equity 
stakeholders and as stewardship-related risks should be at least in part unsystematic, I 
expect the demand for stewardship-related accounting information to increase with the 
influence of non-equity stakeholders.  Using a broad sample of U.S. firms and a set of 
firm-specific metrics for valuation usefulness based on short-window capital market 
reactions to quarterly earnings announcements, I document that the valuation usefulness 
of financial accounting information is consistently negatively related to its stewardship-
orientation.  I conclude from these analyses that valuation usefulness and stewardship are 
alternative objectives of financial accounting. 
Keywords: decision usefulness, valuation usefulness, stewardship, conservatism  3 
1  Introduction 
The objectives of financial accounting are a crucial determinant of financial 
accounting standard setting and research, alike. While it appears undisputed that the 
overall purpose of financial accounting is to provide decision-useful information to 
market participants, the usage of this information differs across subjects. Starting from 
this overall objective of decision usefulness and in line with an extensive body of prior 
literature (among others: Beaver/Demski, 1979; Gjesdal, 1981; Kim, 1995, Christensen et 
al., 2005), Christensen/Demski (2003, pp. 284-300) identify two main sub-objectives of 
accounting: To provide valuation-relevant information and contracting-relevant 
information.  Historically, standard setters identified the objectives of financial 
accounting in a similar fashion.  In SFAC No. 1, the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) states that the overall objective of financial reporting is to provide 
“information that is useful to present and potential investors and creditors and other users 
in making rational investment, credit, and similar decisions” (SFAC 1.34). The Board 
then narrows that focus into, among others, two different sub-objectives: “information to 
help […] users in assessing the amounts, timing, and uncertainty of prospective cash 
receipts” (SFAC 1.37) and “information about how management of an enterprise has 
discharged its stewardship responsibility to owners (stockholders) for the use of 
enterprise resources entrusted to it” (SFAC 1.50).  This paper refers to the overall 
objective of SFAC 1.34 as “decision usefulness” and to the first sub-objective (SFAC  4 
1.37) as “valuation usefulness” and the second sub-objective (SFAC 1.50) as 
“stewardship” or, used synonymously, “contracting usefulness”.
1 
In their current joint project on developing a common conceptual framework of 
financial reporting, the FASB and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)
2 
identify only one objective of financial accounting: decision usefulness. They further 
state that decision-useful information should 
help present and potential investors and creditors and others to assess 
the amounts, timing, and uncertainty of the entity’s future cash inflows and 
outflows (the entity’s future cash flows) (DP IASB/FASB, OB3). 
 
Thereby the Boards appear to be implicitly narrowing the focus of decision 
usefulness on valuation usefulness.  In addition they suggest subsuming the different sub-
objectives of financial accounting under their understanding of “decision usefulness”, as 
they no longer view stewardship and valuation usefulness as alternative sub-objectives:  
Users of financial reports who wish to assess how well management 
has discharged its stewardship responsibilities are generally interested in 
making resource allocation decisions, which include, but are not limited to, 
whether to buy, sell, or hold the entity’s securities or whether to lend money 
to the entity. Decisions about whether to replace or reappoint management, 
how to remunerate management, and how to vote on shareholder proposals 
about management’s policies and other matters are also potential 
considerations in making resource allocation decisions in the broad sense in 
which that term is used in the framework. Thus, the objective of financial 
reporting stated in paragraph OB2 encompasses providing information useful 
in assessing management’s stewardship (DP IASB/FASB, OB28).   
 
This suggestion has already been the topic of heavy debate.  Two of the IASB 
members issued alternative views on the discussion paper.  In the comment letters invited 
by the discussion paper a majority of 86 % of respondents voted against the suggestion to 
                                                 
1  In line with the U.S. standard setter, the processor of the IASB, the International Accounting Standards 
Committee (IASC), in its Framework also identified the overall objective of decision usefulness and 
the derived sub-objectives of valuation and contracting usefulness (FK.12-21). 
2  I refer to the FASB and the IASB as “the Boards” from now on.  5 
drop the stewardship sub objective (DP IASB/FASB, BC32-41 and AV1.1-7; ASB PN 
293; IASB ON 20 FEB 2007, Par. 40-44). 
Building on this motivation, this paper investigates whether valuation usefulness 
and stewardship are compatible or alternative objectives of financial accounting. I offer 
some theoretical arguments discussing why or why not stewardship and valuation 
usefulness could be alternative objectives in the background section. I expect firms to 
balance their accounting choices predominantly depending on the demand for 
contracting-related and valuation-related information by stakeholders. Also, I argue that 
the demands for these different types of information should differ systematically with the 
non-accounting-related governance and informational infrastructure of the firm. 
Notwithstanding this theoretical reasoning, the question whether valuation 
usefulness and stewardship constitute compatible or alternative objectives of financial 
accounting ultimately constitutes an empirical question. This paper addresses this 
empirical question. Doing so requires empirically traceable definitions of valuation 
usefulness and stewardship.  I detail the reasons for my variable choice in the second 
section of the paper. Since I am focusing on actual valuation-related decisions induced by 
financial accounting information, short-window capital market reactions to quarterly 
earnings announcements are used as a proxy for valuation usefulness. Both undirectional 
measures (abnormal turnover and change in bid-ask spread)—which are closely related to 
the notion of information content pioneered by Beaver (1968)—and directional measures 
of the short-window response of returns to earnings changes and earnings surprises, 
similar to the concept of valuation relevance as laid out by Lo/Lys (2000), are applied in 
this paper.  It appears crucial to differentiate between valuation and value relevance.   6 
While the former aims at capturing the actual accounting related valuation decisions, the 
latter targets the alignment between accounting and market information per se, without 
addressing the question whether accounting information is (potentially) useful to market 
participants in valuation-related decisions or whether it merely constitutes an echo of 
information from more timely sources which were already impounded into prices. 
The literature has not agreed upon a definition for stewardship yet, let alone 
developed an empirical proxy for the fulfillment of the stewardship role by financial 
accounting (O’Connell, 2007).  Acknowledging this, I conceptually define stewardship as 
providing information that is useful in assessing management’s actions.  I decide to use 
the asymmetric timeliness of earnings, well known as conditional conservatism, as a 
supply-side proxy for the stewardship-orientation of financial accounting information 
because an extensive body of research documents both theoretically and empirically that 
conditional conservatism is a supply-side answer to the demand for contractual efficient 
accounting information (e.g. Chen et al., 2007; see Watts (2003a,b) for an overview of 
the related literature). 
Using conditional conservatism as a proxy for the supply of stewardship-oriented 
financial accounting information is not without draw-backs, as the concept of asymmetric 
timeliness has been questioned by recent literature (e.g. Dietrich et al., 2007; Givoly et 
al., 2007; see Ryan, 2006, for a recent overview). Therefore and to increase the internal 
robustness of my findings, I apply an additional set of demand-site motivated metrics as 
alternative proxies for the degree of financial accounting’s stewardship-orientation.  As 
laid out in the next section, management not adhering to explicit or implicit contracts 
because of hidden action problems caused by low stewardship-orientation of financial  7 
accounting information imposes at least partly unsystematic risk to stakeholders. As 
diversifying this unsystematic risk component will be more costly to stakeholders facing 
higher transaction costs, the demand for stewardship will be higher for stakeholders 
facing higher levels of transaction costs.  Also, stakeholders facing higher transactions 
costs will generally find it harder to renegotiate their contracts.  If demand and supply are 
in equilibrium, this justifies the use of proxy variables for the relative importance of high-
transactions-costs stakeholders (creditors, suppliers, lessors, employees) as proxies for 
the stewardship-orientation of financial accounting information. 
Using the intersection of daily CRSP with quarterly Compustat and IBES data, I 
estimate my firm-specific constructs for a large panel sample of 119,861 quarterly 
observations of U.S. firms covering the time-span of 1990-2005.  This yields a cross-
sectional sample of 3,245 firm-level observations that are used for the main tests.  In 
order to assess the validity of the firm-level metrics, industries are ranked according to 
the firm-level metrics and out-of sample validity checks are performed based on these 
industry rankings for an even broader sample of up to 311,907 firm-quarter observations. 
The main research question is being assessed by two separate tests. First, the 
impact of valuation usefulness on the asymmetric timeliness of earnings is explored using 
an interacted version of the standard reverse regression approach introduced by Basu 
(1997).  I find that firms with more valuation-useful financial accounting information 
have less asymmetric timely earnings. As a second test for the connection between 
stewardship and valuation usefulness, a determination model for valuation usefulness 
incorporating other determinants that prior literature has found to be connected to the 
valuation usefulness of earnings, is estimated.  Thereby I reach two conclusions. First:  8 
Asymmetric timeliness has a dampening effect on valuation usefulness after controlling 
for other factors that influence the valuation usefulness of financial accounting 
information. Second: When stewardship-orientation is assessed by the relative 
importance of high-transaction-costs stakeholders, I also find that higher levels of 
demand for stewardship lead to lower levels of valuation usefulness. As a side result, I 
find that firms operating in poorer information environments, as indicated by lower 
analyst following and a higher frequency of zero-return trading days, have more 
valuation-useful financial accounting information.  Based on these results, which are 
backed by a set of robustness checks which are detailed in the third section, and stressing 
the importance of the limitations which are presented in the conclusion, I cautiously 
conclude that valuation usefulness and stewardship are alternative objectives of financial 
accounting. 
This paper makes several contributions to interrelated streams in the accounting 
literature.  Directly related to its research question, this paper contributes empirical 
insights to the theoretical discussion about the objectives of financial accounting (e. g. 
Beaver/Demski, 1979; Gjesdal, 1981; Liang, 2000; Lambert, 2001; Liang, 2001; Arya et 
al., 2004; Christensen/Demski, 2004; Christensen et al., 2005). While these authors put 
emphasis on accounting information serving a contracting and a valuation role and 
provide theoretical models describing this dual objective, this paper provides empirical 
evidence generally consistent with their reasoning. While a recent paper (O’Connell, 
2007) explicitly calls for empirical research in this area, the interrelatedness of 
stewardship and valuation usefulness has rarely been investigated empirically in the prior 
literature with one noteworthy exception.  In a recent paper (Bushman et al., 2006) the  9 
authors investigate the linkage between valuation earnings coefficients, derived from a 
value relevance regression, and compensation earnings coefficients, derived from a 
regression of changes in management’s cash compensation on earnings changes.  They 
find these two coefficients to be positively correlated and interpret this evidence as being 
consistent with stewardship and valuation usefulness being compatible objectives of 
financial accounting.  In doing so, they assume that value relevance captures valuation-
usefulness of financial accounting, while this paper argues that valuation usefulness is 
conceptually more appropriately captured by short-window capital market reactions to 
accounting announcements.  In another related paper (LaFond/Watts, 2008), the authors 
find that firms with high levels of information asymmetry, measured by the probability of 
informed trade, have higher levels of conditional conservatism.  LaFond and Watts 
interpret this finding as indicating that conditional conservatism is a rational equilibrium 
response to high levels of information asymmetries between company in- and outsiders. 
The results of this paper compliment the findings of LaFond and Watts in showing that 
conditional conservatism is becoming more pronounced as the valuation usefulness of 
financial accounting information declines. I interpret this finding as indicating that, when 
information asymmetry is high, financial accounting information is becoming less 
suitable to provide hard-to-verify information and thus, is tailored by its prepares towards 
its stewardship role. 
Besides of its main contribution, this paper is providing additional insights into 
the determinants of the information content of financial accounting information (e.g. 
Beaver, 1968; Lipe, 1990; Landsman/Maydew, 2002; Francis et al., 2002a; DeFond et al., 
2007), as it adds to this literature by investigating firm-specific determinants of the  10 
information content of financial accounting information. Also, it provides new insights on 
the determinants and consequences of conservative accounting (e.g. Peek et al., 2006; 
Ball et al., 2008), and on the influence of the information environment on the 
information-incorporating pricing process (e.g. Francis et al., 2002b; Chen et al., 2006; 
Frankel et al., 2006).  Finally, this paper contributes to the discussion of alternative 
metrics of earnings attributes, accounting objectives and their inter-relatedness (e.g. 
Lo/Lys, 2000; Schipper/Vincent, 2003, Francis et al., 2004). 
This paper continues as follows: The second section provides some theoretical 
background to the research question and discusses the development of the metrics for 
valuation usefulness and stewardship. The third section presents the test design, the data, 
and the results. The fourth section concludes. 
2  Background 
2.1  Theory Development 
This paper investigates whether valuation usefulness and stewardship are 
compatible or alternative objectives of financial accounting. I define the two sub-
objectives to be alternatives in theory if and only if the following two conditions are met: 
(a) there is a demand for the fulfillment of both sub-objectives, and (b) both sub-
objectives obeyed separately would give rise to different accounting choices. 
Agency theory rooted analyses predict that an efficient information system used in 
a contractual setting might have different attributes than an information system used in a 
valuation setting (e.g. Gjesdal, 1981; Christensen et al., 2005). Building on that and 
assuming that information is only privately available to the manager ex ante accounting 
disclosure, three possible settings might be interesting. First, the incentives between  11 
manager and stakeholders might be aligned ex ante. Second, the incentives between 
manager and stakeholders might be miss-aligned ex ante but might be alignable by the 
use of accounting information. Third, the incentives between manager and stakeholders 
might be miss-aligned ex ante and might be not alignable by the use of accounting 
information. In the first setting there exists no demand for contracting-useful accounting 
information (assumption (a) from above is violated). In the second setting there is 
demand for contracting-useful accounting information (assumption (a) is fulfilled). In the 
third setting, accounting signals are unverifiable, accounting is cheap talk and thus, 
rational stakeholders would not have any demand for accounting information (again, 
assumption (a) is violated). 
Focusing on the presumable most realistic second scenario, the question becomes 
whether assumption (b) holds under this condition. In this scenario, accounting 
information is used as an input variable to the incentive constraint of the manager. As 
prior research generally shows (for an overview see Lambert, 2001), in this setting 
accounting information performs the better the more directly it is linked to management’s 
actions. Valuation-useful accounting information, in turn, would predominantly be based 
on management’s actions outcomes.  This would indicate that in this setting, demand 
would be high for a contracting-useful accounting system and market participants would 
be willing to sacrifice valuation usefulness for contracting usefulness.  It has been argued 
that in that situation, contracting-useful information is the best available information for 
valuation purposes as well, as only verifiable information can be valuation useful (Watts, 
2003a).  This argument appears plausible from a single firm perspective, in a sense that 
for each single firm there exists an accounting system which balances contractual and  12 
valuation purposes of accounting so that it reaches efficient equilibrium levels of both.  
Applied on the cross-section however, some firms have less incentive miss-alignment ex 
ante and thus might end up with an accounting system which weights the valuation role 
more dominantly (e.g. by disclosing private forward-looking information of the 
management as knowingly misreporting by management is of no concern), while other 
firms with more severe ex ante miss-alignment of incentives might focus on the 
contracting role of accounting. 
Another reason for potential cross-sectional differences in the weighting of 
valuation and the contracting usefulness might be differences in the non-accounting 
informational infrastructure.  This infrastructure consists of non-accounting (voluntary) 
disclosures by the management and of third party disclosures about the firm.  Assuming 
that voluntary disclosures are credible in a sense that they do not constitute cheap talk, 
they constitute a different means for the management to communicate private information 
to stakeholders.  It appears justified to expect that drafting contracts based on voluntary 
disclosures is more costly as managers cannot be forced to voluntarily disclose.  As such, 
voluntary disclosure can mainly be viewed as an alternative valuation-relevant 
accounting disclosure whenever incentives between stakeholders and managers are 
sufficiently aligned.  Third party disclosures in addition can generate valuation-useful 
disclosures but cannot, by definition, give away private information of the management. 
Nevertheless they can help mitigating costly information processes of stakeholders on a 
timely basis and thus can crowd out the valuation usefulness of accounting information to 
some extent. In general I expect that the better the non-accounting informational 
environment of a given firm, the lower the demand for valuation-useful accounting  13 
information.  This decrease in demand should lead c.p. to accounting choices which give 
more weight to contracting-useful accounting information. 
Summing up, if valuation usefulness and stewardship are alternative objectives of 
financial accounting, I expect that firm-specific determinants in the non-accounting-
related governance structure and the informational environment shape the demand for and 
finally the supply of contracting and valuation useful information. Firms which use their 
accounting to align the incentives between managers and stakeholders lack the possibility 
to provide valuation-relevant information. Therefore I expect a negative correlation 
between valuation usefulness and stewardship.  In addition, the demand for and supply of 
valuation-useful accounting information should decline for firms from rich non-
accounting information environments. 
2.2  Measures for Valuation Usefulness and Stewardship 
This section discusses the measures for valuation usefulness and stewardship used 
in this paper. Since the goal of this project is to question the proposed new framework 
approach, I try to define the applied constructs closely in line with what I infer to be the 
standard setters’ definitions.  In the discussion paper containing the draft of the first two 
chapters of the new framework, the Boards define decision-useful information as follows: 
“…information that is useful to present and potential investors and creditors and others in 
making investment, credit, and similar resource allocation decisions” (IASB/FASB DP, 
OB2).  This definition can without substantial loss be shortened to: “…information that is 
useful in making resource allocation decisions.”  This broad definition appears to be of 
little help from an economic stand-point, as, for an economist, every decision is a 
resource allocation decision, and a piece of information is defined as news if it is of some  14 
value to the recipient (Hirshleifer, 1973).  Applying this reasoning, the original definition 
could be condensed even more to simply, “information.”, making the adjective “decision-
useful” redundant. In order for the definition to be empirically traceable, however, it must 
be narrower.  The Boards provide such a definition: “financial reporting should provide 
information to help present and potential investors and creditors and others to assess the 
amounts, timing, and uncertainty of the entity’s future cash inflows and outflows” (DP 
IASB/FASB, OB3).  As asset pricing is based on expected future returns (ultimately 
determined by cash flows) and their covariance with systematic risk factors, this 
definition can be seen as to be very closely related to the term valuation-relevant 
information as laid out by, e.g., Christensen/Demski (2003, pp. 145-147).  Thus, I come 
to the conclusion that effectively the Boards have narrowed the definition of decision 
usefulness to the definition of valuation usefulness. Nevertheless, I still refer to this 
notion as valuation usefulness only, because conceptually decision usefulness has a 
broader focus than valuation usefulness. Following that, this paper defines valuation 
usefulness as the ability of financial accounting information to provide information that is 
relevant for decision making in the valuation process. 
In its draft of the first chapter of the new conceptual framework, the Boards 
describe stewardship as follows: “Management of an entity is accountable to owners 
(shareholders) for the custody and safekeeping of the entity’s economic resources and for 
their efficient and profitable use” (DP IASB/FASB, OB 27).  In that sense they define the 
stewardship role of financial accounting as providing information that “is useful in 
assessing how well management has discharged its stewardship responsibilities” (DP 
IASB/FASB, OB 27).  This focuses on information about management actions such as  15 
operational, financing, and investment decisions, as well as on management 
communications to stakeholders.  In this sense, the term stewardship is closely related to 
the Christensen/Demski (2003, pp. 229-230) notion of the contracting role of accounting.  
That is why I define stewardship as providing information that is useful for the evaluation 
of management’s actions.  It is important to note that the definitions of valuation 
usefulness and stewardship used in this paper naturally overlap: Information about 
management’s failure to stick to a current investment plan, for example, might well be 
decision-useful to some/all stakeholders for estimating future cash flows from investing 
activities.  But they are also not theoretically conjunct.  Imagine a situation where 
financial accounting fulfills its stewardship role perfectly.  In that case, contracts could be 
written in a way so that management’s actions would perfectly align with investors’ 
preferences; accounting would not report any deviations by the management from the 
optimal path, and because of that would not yield any surprises; the value of the firm 
would follow a random walk; and accounting would not be decision-useful for valuation 
purposes. 
In prior literature the term valuation usefulness has often been linked to the 
concept of the value relevance of financial accounting information (e.g., Bushman et al., 
2006; Barth et al., 2001). Value relevance is normally defined as the strength of the link 
between accounting information (predominantly measured by earnings (changes) and/or 
book value of earnings) and the value of the according firm (predominantly measured by 
the price or return of its equity shares).  Undoubtfully, value relevance is an important 
attribute of financial accounting.  It appears questionable however, whether in can be 
linked to the valuation usefulness of financial accounting information (Holthausen/Watts,  16 
2001).  Asset prices are influenced by financial accounting as well as by other non-
financial-accounting information.  To the extent that financial accounting information just 
confirms non-financial-accounting information which was available to the market before, 
it can hardly be valuation useful by itself.  To the extreme: if financial accounting is 
defined to mimic asset price returns, it becomes absolutely value-relevant from an 
empirical measurement perspective, while being a pure echo of previous signals and thus 
providing no valuation-useful information.
3  While playing a confirmatory role might 
well be a very important objective of financial accounting from the contractual 
standpoint, valuation usefulness implies that market participants learn something from 
financial accounting what they not already know. 
When operationalizing the definition of valuation usefulness, I also refrain from 
assuming priors about the valuation models market participants are using. Instead, this 
paper investigates empirical manifestations of valuation-related decisions that can be 
traced back to the arrival of accounting information with a comparably high probability. 
Consequently, it investigates the equity market, as conceptually, the value of equity 
should be more closely related to firm fundamentals than the value of debt instruments or 
the values of other stakeholders’ claims, which are less dependent on the economic 
performance of the reporting entity.  In addition, the equity market has undisputable 
advantages with respect to data availability.  However, there are some limitations to 
focusing solely on the equity market.  First, in choosing not to investigate valuation-
                                                 
3  To the extent that confirming financial accounting information reduces uncertainty about the future 
states of the world, it is still decision useful. However, (a) in equilibrium with perfect financial 
accounting information no such uncertainty would exist because market participants would penalize 
managers for ex-ante miss-informing ex post, incentivizing them to truthfully disclose ex ante and (b) 
the concept of value relevance does not separate between new information, confirming information 
and pure echoes.  17 
related decisions on all relevant stakeholder markets, (e.g., the debt, labor, goods, or 
suppliers markets) internal validity becomes a concern.  Second, one can measure only 
actual decisions, not the general ability of financial accounting information to affect 
decisions. 
In order to identify valuation-related decisions caused by the arrival of new 
accounting information, this paper focuses on short-window capital market reactions to 
quarterly earnings announcements. It uses a short-window research design in order to 
ensure that the observed valuation-related decisions are by a high probability caused by 
new accounting information. This concept is related to the “information content” concept 
in the empirical accounting literature (among many others, Beaver, 1968; 
Landsman/Maydew, 2002).  While the traditional information content literature focuses 
on undirectional market reactions to the announcement of information (Lo/Lys, 2000), 
this paper also focuses on directional reaction to earnings-related information. So, it 
studies short-window earnings-returns coefficients (based on earnings changes and on 
analyst forecast errors) along with abnormal turnover and changes in bid-ask spreads 
around quarterly earnings announcement dates. The third section of this paper will give 
additional details concerning the empirical operationalization of these four metrics. 
Developing an operational metric for stewardship is far from trivial.  As I define 
financial accounting’s fulfillment of the stewardship role as to provide information that is 
useful in evaluating management’s actions, an indicator variable is needed that captures 
the existence of this type of information.  Following the reasoning presented above, such 
an indicator variable could be constructed by observing contracts in which financial 
accounting data is used to assess management’s actions.  Given that I am not aware of a  18 
sufficiently large source of archival data about such contractual decisions,
4 I see two 
possible substitute concepts.  First, as argued in the previous section, it can be assumed 
that markets, in general, balance the demand for and supply of stewardship-related 
financial accounting information.  Under that assumption, firms with stakeholders having 
a high demand for the stewardship role of accounting would provide more contracting-
useful financial accounting information.  Following this reasoning, the demand for 
stewardship could be used as a proxy for the supply of stewardship.  It can be expected 
that different stakeholder groups of a given entity differ systematically in their demand 
for stewardship-related accounting information.  Stewardship affects expected returns by 
influencing the probability that management is honoring implicit or explicit accounting-
related contracts. The propensity of management to expropriate wealth from the 
stakeholders depends on the governance infrastructure and on implicit cultural standards 
and rules, which differ at the firm, industry, and country levels.  From this follows that 
stewardship-related valuation impacts can be assumed to be predominantly a source of 
unsystematic risk.  Thus, stakeholders should be able to diversify away substantial parts 
of stewardship-related risks.  As diversifying is more costly for asset classes facing 
higher transaction costs, this would mean that investors facing lower transaction costs in 
the contractual relationship with the respective entity would have less demand for 
stewardship-related information.  This reasoning could be operationalized so that the 
demand for stewardship-related information can be expected to increase with the 
proportion of debt financing (lending by suppliers, employee involvement in the value 
                                                 
4  Obvious contractual decisions linked to accounting information would be, e.g., management 
compensation contracts, debt covenants, and some collective labor agreements.  It might be an 
interesting avenue for future research to use data in these (and probably other) contracts to assess 
whether firms having relatively more of these contracts produce less valuation-useful earnings.  19 
creation process, lease-based financing) as debt holders (suppliers, employees, lessors), in 
general, face higher transaction costs than equity holders (Benston/Smith, 1976). 
Nevertheless, this reasoning relies on demand for and supply of stewardship-
related information to be in equilibrium.  If there is an imbalance between demand and 
supply induced by market frictions, this demand-driven concept is invalid.  Thus, this 
approach in applied as a secondary test, only.  For the main analyses, I rely on the only 
measure of supply of stewardship-related accounting information that I am aware of: 
conditional conservatism, also referred to as earnings conservatism, news dependent 
conservatism, or asymmetric timeliness. A substantial body of literature theoretically and 
empirically supports the notion that asymmetric timeliness constitutes a supply-side 
response to the demand for contracting-related accounting information (e.g. Chen et al, 
2007; Zhang, 2007).  As stewardship-related accounting information requires a greater 
degree of hardness (verifiability) for a given signal whenever management and 
stakeholder incentives are a priori aligned, mandating a higher degree of verification for 
gains than for losses constitutes a rational rule for stewardship-related information. Thus, 
this paper uses the asymmetric timeliness metric since it is a theoretically and empirically 
well founded measure for the stewardship orientation of financial accounting information. 
3  Empirical Analyses 
3.1  Data and Sample Selection  
Defining suitable firm-level measures of valuation usefulness and stewardship 
requires repeated observations over time for each firm.  The problem with investigating 
firm attributes on time-series data is twofold.  (1) As accounting data is of low frequency, 
the low numbers of time-series observations available for statistical analyses lead to a  20 
relatively low power of the resulting statistics.  (2) Increasing the time-span in order to 
increase the number of observations per firm, and thus the power of the resulting 
statistics, gives rise to serious internal validity concerns: Estimating firm-specific 
attributes over a period of time implies that these firm attributes are constant over this 
time period, which might not be the case (Givoly et al., 2007). 
I choose my sample in order to minimize these concerns. First of all, I limit the 
initial time period to the 16 years between 1990 and 2005.  While it can still be argued 
that firms changed substantially during this period, this comparably short but current time 
period should be warranted, given that sample size would decrease and external validity 
concerns would increase substantially if a time-span from a period in the past with 
supposedly fewer structural changes would be used. Second, I focus on the U.S. market 
and use quarterly accounting data for the analyses. As the U.S. market is the largest 
equity market in the world, and quarterly accounting data is the highest frequency of 
accounting data available, this design choice maximizes the number of firm-specific 
observations within the time-span available to the analyses. 
The analyses require quarterly earnings per share data and earnings announcement 
dates from Compustat; daily price, volume and returns data from CRSP; and quarterly 
earnings per share forecast data from IBES to calculate the firm-level attributes and to 
conduct the tests. In order to maximize the number of firms in the cross-sectional sample, 
I require only ten non-consecutive firm-specific input observations for the calculation of 
each of the firm-specific attributes.
5 In order for the firm to become part of the cross-
sectional sample, I require that all firm-level attributes are calculable for it. Applying 
these requirements yields a cross-sectional sample of 3,245 firms.  In order to calculate 
                                                 
5  I vary the minimum amount of observations to up to 30, finding qualitatively unchanged results.  21 
the firm-specific attributes for these 3,245 firms, a panel sample of 119,861 observations 
is used.  Details of the composition of the panel sample across time and industries can be 
inferred from Appendix 2.  For the sake of clarity, I refer to the cross-sectional sample of 
3,245 firms as the “cross-sectional sample” and to the panel sample of 119,861 firm-year 
observations as the “panel sample” throughout the paper. 
In addition “out-of-sample” analyses are conducted throughout the paper, where 
industry group rankings of the firm-specific attributes are used to verify their external 
validity.  For each of these analyses, the unique maximum number of firm-year 
observations available is used, meaning that firms with insufficient data to calculate the 
firm-specific attributes are included in the sample. The maximum number of firm-year 
observations for that sample is 311,907. I refer to this sample as the “full sample” 
throughout the paper. 
3.2  Calculation of the Valuation Usefulness Metrics 
Table 1 details the construction of the firm-level valuation usefulness metrics.  
Variable definitions are given in Appendix 1.  To estimate the average abnormal share 
turnover around the quarterly earnings announcement date, first the average turnover of 
the three-day window surrounding the quarterly earnings announcement date is 
calculated. Then an average firm-quarter specific share turnover is constructed by 
calculating the mean of the two windows starting five and ending 30 days before and 
after the quarterly earnings announcement date.  The abnormal quarterly earnings 
announcement turnover of firm i (ATOVERi) is the difference between the average 
turnover of the earnings announcement period and the average turnover of the two  22 
surrounding periods.
6  As can be inferred from Panel A of Table 1 and in line with 
expectations and prior literature (e.g. Landsman/Maydew, 2002), ATOVER is 
significantly positive for both the mean and the median, indicating that, on average, share 
turnover is higher for quarterly earnings announcement periods than it is for non-
reporting periods. 
To calculate the change in bid-ask spreads around quarterly earnings 
announcement dates, the average bid-ask spread of the four-day period beginning two 
days after the quarterly earnings announcement date and the average bid-ask-spread of 
the four-day period ending two days prior to the quarterly earnings announcement date 
are calculated. In line with prior literature (Kim/Verrecchia, 1994; Brooks, 1996; 
Krinskey/Lee, 1996; Gajewski, 1999), as investors need time to incorporate earnings 
information and as new information asymmetry might be growing quickly, I use short 
periods excluding the actual event dates to calculate the measure of bid-ask spread 
change induced by quarterly earnings announcements (ΔBASi). Panel A of Table 1 
verifies that the average firm experiences a significant decrease in its bid-ask spread 
around its quarterly earnings announcement periods. Nevertheless, with the standard 
deviation of ΔBASi being quite high, considerable variance across firms exists with a 
substantial body of firms experiencing an increase in ΔBASi around their earnings 
announcement dates.  This result is in line with prior results and with the theoretical 
predictions by Kim/Verrecchia (1994). 
                                                 
6  Where applicable throughout the analyses, all dependent and independent variables are winsorized by 
their top and bottom percentiles.  Deleting the winsorized observations does not qualitatively influence 
the results.  23 
The next metric of the valuation usefulness of accounting data is based on the 
short-window earnings response coefficient (ERCi), which is estimated as the coefficient 
α1,i of model (1) 
(1)  i t i t i i i t NI CAR , , , 1 , 0 , ε α α + Δ + = , 
where CAR is the cumulative abnormal return of the three-day window around the 
quarterly earnings announcement date, and ΔNI is the change in price-deflated earnings 
per share from the same quarter of the last year (detailed definitions are given in 
Appendix 1).
7 Model (1) is estimated as a firm-specific time-series model separately for 
each firm that has 10 or more non-consecutive observations available. As can be seen in 
Panel A, the average of ERCi across the firms of the cross-sectional sample is 
significantly positive for both the median and the mean, indicating that market 
participants react to an increase (decrease) in earnings by adjusting their willingness to 
pay accordingly, causing a positive (negative) abnormal return. 
The final valuation usefulness measure relies on earnings forecast data from 
IBES. The short-window response coefficient of the earnings forecast error (FCERCi) is 
estimated as the coefficient α1,i of model (2) 
(2)  i t i t i i i t FCE CAR , , , 1 , 0 , ε α α + + = , 
where CAR is the cumulative abnormal return of the three-day window around the 
quarterly earnings announcement date, and FCE is the forecast error from the last mean 
IBES earnings forecast before the quarterly earnings announcement date (detailed 
definitions are given in Appendix 1). Model (2) is estimated as a firm-specific time-series 
                                                 
7  The robustness of model (1) is tested by replacing ΔNI with the change of NI from the prior quarter 
and by the difference of NI and a forecast of NI based on a AR(4) model on the firm’s time-series of 
NI finding qualitatively the same results.  24 
model separately for each firm that has 10 or more non-consecutive observations 
available. Similar to ERC, but even more consistently so, Panel A reports FCERC to be 
significantly positive, lending additional support to the overall valuation usefulness of 
financial accounting data.  
The four firm-specific attributes capture different aspects of valuation usefulness. 
While the first metric (ATOVER) supposedly captures all market transactions induced by 
the arrival of new accounting information, the second metric (ΔBAS) focuses on the 
effect accounting data disclosure has on information asymmetry. Imagine a situation 
where the arrival of new accounting data in combination with the informational priors of 
market participants causes higher levels of information dispersion. This dispersion will, 
c.p., lead to higher ATOVER, indicating higher levels of market activity and higher 
ΔBAS, which indicates higher levels of information asymmetry (Kim/Verrechhia, 1994). 
Both ATOVER and ΔBAS speak distinctively to decisions induced by the arrival of new 
accounting information: Market activities are direct results of the decisions of market 
participants, while an increase in information asymmetry makes the valuation process 
more costly. Compared with the former two undirectional metrics, the latter two (ERCi 
and FCERCi) are more directly linked to the predominant accounting summary measure 
of economic performance: earnings. While they fail to measure decisions induced by 
other accounting information, accounting-based valuation models justify the assumption 
that current earnings are a central input factor in estimating future cash flows. The 
standard setters see the fundamental role of accounting as helping investors and creditors 
to decide upon their expected values of future cash flows, and I posit that the earnings- 25 
related metrics of valuation usefulness most closely relate to the concept of valuation 
usefulness the standard setting bodies appear to have in mind. 
Besides separately estimating the link between valuation usefulness and 
stewardship for each measure of valuation usefulness, I construct a combined measure of 
valuation usefulness (VUSCORE) that is based on decile ranks of the four metrics (with 
ΔBASi multiplied by -1 to ensure proper ranking) and is scaled between zero and one. 
Panel B of Table 1 backs the theoretical arguments presented above, as the correlation 
across the different metrics of valuation usefulness is generally low to moderate; and the 
correlation of ΔBAS with the other metrics is the lowest. 
Panel C of Table 1 compares the average values of the combined valuation 
usefulness metric VUSCORE across industries. It shows significant differences across 
industries, with firms from the “Shop” industry group exhibiting the highest valuation 
usefulness and firms from the “Utilities” industry group the lowest. As an aside, it is 
interesting to note that firms from industries known for high levels of political cost and 
regulation (Money, Extracting Industries, and Utilities) and firms from industries with 
high levels of intangibles and intellectual capital (Telecom and Chemicals) constitute the 
lower half of the industry ranking, indicating that these are the industries with the least 
valuation-useful accounting information.
8 
                                                 
8  The industry ranking variable VUIND is used to test the external validity of the VUSCORE metric out 
of the panel-data sample. Tests for the full sample (not tabulated) show that the positive correlation of 
ΔNI and FCE with CAR increases consistently with VUIND and that VUIND is positively correlated 
to ATOVER and -ΔBAS. These results provide assurance for the general out-of-sample validity of the 
VUSCORE metric.  26 
3.3  Calculation of the Asymmetric Timeliness Metric 
As discussed in section 2, stewardship is a not well defined concept, while this 
paper assumes that financial accounting is fulfilling the stewardship role when it provides 
information that is useful in evaluating management’s actions. Evaluating management’s 
actions is predominantly done for contracting purposes. Following a rich line of literature 
(Basu, 1997; Watts, 2003 a,b; and many others) that suggests conservatism of accounting 
(here measured by the asymmetric timeliness of earnings) is the leading indicator of the 
contractual efficiency of accounting data, I interpret asymmetric timeliness as this paper’s 
main indicator for the level of fulfillment of the stewardship role of accounting. 
In line with prior research using quarterly data (Basu et al., 2001; Givoly et al., 
2007), asymmetric timeliness is measured based on the following piecewise ‘reverse’ 
earnings-on-returns regression: 
(3)  i t i t i t i i t i i t i i i t RET NEG RET NEG NI , , , , 3 , , 2 , , 1 , 0 , * ε β β β β + + + + =  , 
where NI is price deflated earnings per share, and RET is the buy-and-hold return for the 
quarter.  NEG is one if RET is negative and zero otherwise (detailed definitions are given 
in Appendix 1).  Model (3) is estimated as a time-series model for each firm that has 
more than 10 observations available. To ensure that enough observations with negative 
returns are available in order to produce meaningful estimates of β3,i, at least five 
observations with negative values for RET are required. 
Most commonly, the level of conditional conservatism is assessed by analyzing 
the value of β3,i from model (3). If β3,i is significantly positive, firm i is said to exhibit 
conditional conservatism behavior on average, as β3,i is an indicator for the asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings with respect to bad versus good news. This paper compares the  27 
level of asymmetric timeliness across firms and so needs a metric for relative differences 
in asymmetric timeliness. Following a method suggested by Gassen et al. (2006), I 
calculate the metric of asymmetric timeliness used in this paper based on the regression 
coefficients and on the geometric notion of the kink in the resulting regression line. 
Applying trigonometry yields: CONSi = arctan(β3,i + β2,i) - arctan(β2,i). Based on prior 
literature, the sample is expected to exhibit asymmetric timely behavior on average, thus 
the mean and median of CONS are expected to be significantly positive. 
Panel A of Table 2 verifies this. Also in line with prior literature (Francis et al., 
2004; Gassen et al., 2006; Givoly et al., 2007), a substantial number of firms having 
CONS below zero are found, indicating an inverse asymmetric timely accounting 
behavior (faster recognition of gains than of losses). This result mandates some analyses 
to address internal validity concerns and to verify the metric for asymmetric timeliness. 
In Panel B the panel sample is partionated by deciles of the firm-level metric of 
asymmetric timeliness in 10 groups. If CONS is capturing asymmetric timeliness in the 
original sense for the panel sample, the asymmetric timeliness is expected to increase 
systematically across the 10 sub-samples. To test this model (4) is estimated for each of 
the sub-samples. 
(4) 
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where NI is price-deflated earnings per share, and RET is the buy-and-hold return for the 
quarter.  NEG is one if RET is negative and zero otherwise. YEAR and FFINDUSTRY 
are year and industry fixed effects, respectively (detailed definitions are given in 
Appendix 1).  Model (4) is estimated for each sub-sample using OLS and significance  28 
tests are based on standard errors clustered by firms.  The results of the 10 regressions are 
reported in Panel B of Table 2. In order to compare the level of asymmetric timeliness 
across samples, CONSD is calculated as arctan(β3 + β2) - arctan(β2).  As can easily be 
seen, the asymmetric timeliness of the sub-samples increases nearly monotonically with 
their CONS rank. The trend across all relevant coefficients and CONSD is significant at 
conventional levels as assessed by OLS regressions of the coefficients on their samples’ 
ranks and as reported by the right-most column of Panel B.  Based on these results, I 
conclude that the firm-specific metric CONSi captures the concept of asymmetric 
timeliness. 
Panel C reports the average levels of CONS across industries, indicating that asymmetric 
timeliness is highest for firms in the “Telecom” industry and lowest for firms in the 
“Utilities” industry. Although CONS exhibits significant variance across industries, 
substantial within-industry variance of CONS is also observed, leading to the question 
whether asymmetric timeliness is driven by industry-level determinants.  Nevertheless, 
CONSIND, an industry ranking based on CONS, is used to test the external validity of 
CONS for the full sample. Results for the full sample (not tabulated) indicate that the 
level of asymmetric timeliness consistently increases with CONSIND. I view this result 
as supporting my conclusion that CONS is a robust firm-specific measure of asymmetric 
timeliness, and thus a reasonable proxy for the fulfillment of the stewardship role by 
accounting information. 
3.4  Connection between Stewardship and Valuation Usefulness 
This section addresses the core research question of the paper: Do higher levels of 
stewardship lead to higher levels of valuation usefulness? As laid out in the second  29 
section, two different proxy concepts for the stewardship-orientation of financial 
accounting information will be applied. First, I will use the conditional conservatism 
metric CONS, developed in the previous section, as a supply-side metric. Using this 
metric, I apply three different tests using the panel sample, the full sample, and the cross-
sectional sample (Table 3 and 4). After that, four proxies for the relative importance of 
high-transaction-costs stakeholders will be used as demand-site related metrics for the 
stewardship-orientation of financial accounting information (Table 5). 
A first analysis, reported in Panel A of Table 3, investigates for the panel sample 
whether valuation usefulness has an impact on the stewardship role of accounting by 
estimating the following model: 
(5) 
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where NI is price-deflated earnings per share, and RET is the buy-and-hold return for the 
quarter.  NEG is one if RET is negative and zero otherwise.  VUSCORE is the combined 
metric of valuation usefulness.  YEAR is a series of yearly and FFINDUSTRY a series of 
industry fixed effects (detailed definitions are given in Appendix 1).  Model (5) is 
estimated on the panel sample using OLS and the significance tests are based on standard 
errors clustered by firms. 
Panel A details the results. The coefficients β5 and β7 are of particular interest, 
indicating the impact of valuation usefulness on the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. 
The interaction between RET and the valuation usefulness score is significantly positive, 
indicating that firms with more valuation useful accounting information have more timely  30 
earnings with respect to gains. In addition, the three-way interaction 
REG*NET*VUSCORE is significantly negative, indicating that firms with more 
valuation-useful financial accounting have less asymmetric timely earnings, which are 
timelier in gain situations. This result speaks to the paper’s main research question: 
Having overall timely gains with no asymmetric component appears to be an attribute of 
valuation-useful earnings, while being less efficient from a stewardship perspective, as 
fulfilling the stewardship role is supported by asymmetric timely earnings. Based on this 
analysis, I would cautiously conclude that stewardship and valuation usefulness are 
alternative objectives of financial accounting. 
I test the robustness of this finding out-of-sample based on the full sample and on 
the industry rank measure of valuation usefulness, VUIND. Specifically, the following 
model is estimated: 
(6) 
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where NI is price deflated earnings per share, and RET is the buy-and-hold return for the 
quarter.  NEG is one if RET is negative and zero otherwise.  VUIND is an industry rank 
variable based on VUSCORE, the combined metric of valuation usefulness.  YEAR is a 
series of yearly fixed effects (detailed definitions are given in Appendix 1).  Model (6) is 
estimated on the full sample using OLS and the significance tests are based on standard 
errors clustered by firms. 
Again, the discussion focuses on β5 and β7. Both coefficients are significant; the 
two-way interaction RET*VUIND is positive and the three-way interaction  31 
RET*NEG*VUIND is negative. These results confirm the findings of Panel A discussed 
above for the full sample. 
The documented impact of valuation usefulness on asymmetric timeliness in 
Table 3 could be driven by other factors that influence valuation usefulness and 
asymmetric timeliness simultaneously, causing a spurious correlation between them.   
This competing explanation is examined by including determinants of valuation 
usefulness in a multivariate setting in Table 4. The following model is estimated on the 
cross-sectional sample using OLS: 
(7) 
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where the dependent variable VUVAR is either ATOVER, ΔBAS, ERC, FCERC, or 
VUSCORE. SIZE is the natural logarithm of average market capitalization.  NUMEST is 
the average number of analysts following the firm.  MTB is the average market-to-book 
ratio.  PRED is a measure of earnings predictability: the R² coefficient of a AR(4) time-
series regression, regressing current quarter earnings per share (price-deflated) on prior 
quarter earnings per share. PERS is a measure of earnings persistence: the sum of the 
AR(1) and AR(4) coefficients from the AR(4) time-series regression of current quarter 
earnings per share on prior periods earnings per share.  ZRETURN is the average 
percentage of trading days with zero returns to the firm. CONS is the firm-specific 
measure of asymmetric timeliness, and FFINDUSTRY is a set of industry fixed effects 
(detailed definitions are given in Appendix 1). 
SIZE is included as a variable controlling for the public visibility of the firm and 
other institutional aspects correlated with the size of the firm such as risk, agency  32 
conflicts, and reporting costs. I make no sign prediction for size. In order to evaluate 
accounting information and transform it into valuation-relevant information, an 
informational infrastructure is needed. Financial analysts are part of this infrastructure 
and, thus, the average number of analysts following the firm should be positively related 
to the valuation usefulness of accounting information. On the other hand, it can be argued 
that analysts are acting as substitutes for, and not as complements to, accounting 
information (Francis et al., 2002). In that case, a negative relation could be expected. 
The market-to-book ratio is used as a measure of growth opportunities available to 
the firm.
9 Decisions made in growing firms tend to be complex than those in static firms, 
and thus one could expect accounting information to be more useful for evaluating 
growth firms. Again, this reasoning might well be questioned: As growth firms are often 
part of intangible, capital-intensive industries, and as accounting is argued to be less 
informative in these settings (Francis/Schipper, 1999), it could also be expected that 
financial accounting is less valuation-useful for high growth firms. 
Prior literature discusses (Schipper/Vincent, 2003) and documents (Francis et al., 
2004) the link between earnings attributes and the valuation usefulness of earnings. From 
a valuation framework standpoint, earnings should be more valuation-useful whenever 
they are more persistent, as more persistent earnings yield more information about future 
cash flows. Viewed similarly, earnings that are easier to predict provide more reliant 
                                                 
9  Market-to-book is used in the literature as a proxy for a vast diversity of economic concepts including 
risk, conservatism, and growth (for an overview: Gassen et al., 2006). As the model controls for 
conditional conservatism, it appears to be valid to view MTB as a proxy for growth. Nevertheless, 
caution is to be applied when interpreting the results.  33 
input factors and, thus, can be expected to be more valuation-useful.
10 Thus, the model 
incorporates PERS and PRED and both proxies are expected to be positively related to 
the valuation usefulness of financial accounting.
11 
In order to manifest itself in the measures of valuation usefulness, financial 
accounting information has to enter the price formation process. In a world where 
transaction costs are present and differ systematically across firms, the pricing 
mechanism cannot be assumed to be homogenous across all firms. I therefore include the 
percentage of zero returns to control for the information environment of the firm. The 
percentage of zero returns is a measure of transaction costs and liquidity (Lesmond et al., 
1999) and can be regarded as a proxy for information impounded into prices (Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al., 2006). The information environment influences the way accounting 
information is evaluated by market participants. If the information environment is low 
overall, accounting information might gain higher relative importance, given the absence 
of other valuation-relevant information (Francis et al., 2002). On the other hand, market 
participants might have problems incorporating accounting information on short notice, 
due to higher levels of information asymmetry and fewer market participants willing to 
trade. Thus, I make no sign predictions for ZRETURN. The final variable of model (8) is 
the main variable of interest, the firm-specific measure of asymmetric timeliness, CONS, 
                                                 
10  It can be argued however that earnings that are very easy to predict cannot be decision useful, as they 
convey no new information to the market. Thus, the variable PERS appears to be the concept more 
directly linked to the valuation role of earnings, and PRED is included mainly due to its role in prior 
literature. 
11  In additional analyses (not tabulated) a third earnings attribute, earnings smoothness, defined as the 
standard deviation of net income divided by the standard deviation of cash flows from continuing 
operations, in included in model (8). Earnings smoothing is found to be significantly positively related 
to valuation usefulness, while other variables of interest are qualitatively unchanged. The model 
without smoothing is reported in the paper, as requiring cash flow data reduces the cross-sectional 
sample from 3,425 to 2,817 firm observations. Also, in untabulated robustness results, additional 
explanatory variables (standard deviation of daily abnormal returns, standard deviation of operating 
cash flows, frequency of losses, average operating cycle) are included as proxy variables for the firm’s 
operating and risk environment. These additional variables do not qualitatively affect the results.  34 
which I view as a measure of the relative fulfillment of the stewardship role of accounting 
for the given firm.  According to this paper’s research design setup, I make no sign 
prediction for CONS. 
Panels A and B of Table 4 report the descriptive statistics of the independent 
variables and the correlations, respectively.  Generally, correlations are moderate to low 
and in the expected direction.  The regression results of model (7) are displayed in Panel 
C.  The results for the individual metrics for valuation usefulness are discussed first. For 
ATOVER as the valuation usefulness proxy, the abnormal turnover around quarterly 
earnings announcement dates is significantly positively related to the number of analysts 
following, the growth prospects of the firm, and the informational efficiency of the price 
process (captured by lower levels of ZRETURN), while it is negatively related to size and 
the persistence of earnings. I interpret these findings as indicative that the informational 
environment plays an active role when accounting information is being used by market 
participants. Active markets with sufficient analyst coverage support accounting 
information in generating abnormal trading activities. 
When the change in bid-ask spreads around quarterly earnings announcement 
dates is used as the dependent variable, it is positively related to size, the growth 
prospects of the firm, and the level of asymmetric timeliness, and negatively related to 
the informational efficiency of the price process. The negative impact of the 
informational environment on the change in bid-ask spreads is as expected. The relation 
to growth fits well with the result for the abnormal turnover, and it may indicate that, for 
growth firms, financial accounting information, on average, induces more information 
dispersion in the market, causing increased trading and raising bid-ask spreads. However,  35 
it is interesting that more asymmetric timely earnings have a positive impact on the bid-
ask spread change around quarterly earnings announcement dates, indicating that 
asymmetric timely earnings correlate with higher levels of information asymmetry. This 
finding is consistent to LaFond/Watts (2008) which document that firms with higher 
information asymmetries have more asymmetric timely earnings. Alternatively, it might 
be explained by the two sides of asymmetric timely earnings. Losses generally are 
communicated to the market before earnings are disclosed, and gains are not transformed 
into earnings in a timely manner, yielding blurred earnings metrics in gain situations and 
increasing information asymmetry over the short window. 
The next regression uses the short window earnings change response coefficient 
as a directional measure for valuation usefulness.  This market reaction on earnings 
change is found to be positively related to growth and the predictability and persistence 
of earnings, while it is negatively related to the number of analysts following, the 
informational efficiency of the price process, and the level of asymmetric timeliness.  
While the positive results are as expected, the negative results are very interesting.  First 
of all, asymmetric timely earnings cause a less pronounced market response.  Again, a 
possible explanation for this result is that the market leads the accounting in the case of 
losses and untimely earnings have relatively low valuation relevance in the case of gains.  
I take particular interest in the result indicating that firms with poorer informational 
infrastructure (indicated by less analyst following and a higher percentage of zero trading 
days) observe a more pronounced short-window market response on earnings changes. I 
interpret this result as evidence for earnings being more valuation useful for firms with 
poorer information infrastructures.  36 
When evaluating the short-window market response to earnings forecast errors it 
is found that it is positively related to size, the number of analysts following, and the 
growth prospects of the firm, and negatively related to the amount of asymmetric 
timeliness. Again, the positive relations are as expected, as in the case of earnings 
forecast errors the informational infrastructure, especially the number of analysts, has a 
positive impact on the quality of the signal. The negative relation between the market 
reaction to earnings surprises and asymmetric timeliness can be explained by asymmetric 
timely earnings presenting no or only opaque new information to the market. 
In the right-most column, the results for the summary metric of valuation 
usefulness are reported.  It is found to be positively related to the number of analysts 
following, the persistence of earnings, and the informational efficiency of the pricing 
process, and negatively related to the level of asymmetric timeliness. 
After investigating the impact of stewardship on valuation usefulness when 
stewardship is being measured by the asymmetric timeliness of accounting earnings, 
Table 5 contains the results for the alternative demand-side metrics which measure the 
relative importance of high-transaction-costs stakeholders. As laid out in section two, 
high-transaction-costs stakeholders are assumed to have an on average higher demand for 
stewardship-oriented financial accounting information. The applied metrics for the 
relative importance of high-transaction-costs stakeholders are detailed in Panel A of 
Table 5. The relative importance of debt holders is measured by DEBTi which is the 
average of total debt divided by total assets for firm i.
12  ACC_PAYi, the average of 
                                                 
12  It can well be argued that debt holders do not face significantly higher transactions costs than equity 
holders in general. I still assume that on average debt holders bare higher transaction costs in my 
sample, since the sample is limited to firms with public equity outstanding but contains firms with 
private as well as with public debt. As investors generally face higher transaction costs on private  37 
accounts payable divided by total assets over the time-series firm i, measures the relative 
importance of lenders.  The relative influence of lessors is captured by RENTEXPi, the 
average of rental expenses divided by net sales over the time-series of firm i.  Finally, the 
relative importance of employees is being captured by EMPLi, the average of employees 
in thousands divided by net sales in million USD for firm i.  All variables are based on 
yearly Compustat data.  Requiring this data reduces the cross-sectional sample from 
3,425 to 2,978 observations. I refer to the resulting sample as the limited cross-sectional 
sample. 
Panel B reports the correlation between the demand-side stewardship measures, 
CONS and VUSCORE. First of all, VUSCORE is consistently negatively correlated with 
all demand-side stewardship measures, lending univariate support for the claim that 
valuation usefulness and stewardship are alternative objectives of financial accounting. 
Second, asymmetric timeliness is only significantly positively correlated with DEBT, 
indicating in line with prior literature that the demand for asymmetric timely earnings 
increases with the relative importance of debt financing (Peek et al., 2006; Zhang, 2007). 
The remaining correlation of CONS with the demand-side stewardship measures are low, 
indicating that these metrics capture different aspects of the stewardship orientation of 
financial accounting information and thus justifying their use in this research design.  All 
other correlations are moderate to low, with exemption of RENTEXP and EMPL which 
exhibit a high correlation probably due to sharing the same denominator.  Because of this 
correlation, caution is used when interpreting model (9) which includes both variables as 
explanatory variables. 
                                                                                                                                                   
capital markets, a higher percentage of capital traded on private markets indicates higher transactions 
costs.  38 
Panel C reports the results of two determinant models: 
(8) 
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where SSHIP stands for one of the demand-side stewardship measures (DEBT, 
ACC_PAY, RENTEXP, EMPL) and all other variables are as defined and discussed in 
the presentation of model (7).  In model (9) all stewardship metrics are included together 
to assess their inter-relatedness.  Both models are estimated using OLS.  Turning to the 
model results, the model estimates for the non-stewardship-related explanatory variables 
are in general qualitatively the same as presented in Table 4 and will thus not be 
discussed further. Focusing on the stewardship-retaled metrics, I find for the four 
versions of model (8), that all metrics load significantly negative, indicating that the 
valuation usefulness of quarterly financial accounting information decreases as the 
relative importance of high-transaction-cost stakeholders increases. I interpret this finding 
as consistent with the notion that the higher the demand for stewardship-oriented 
financial reporting the lower the valuation usefulness of financial accounting information, 
clearly lending support to the claim that stewardship and valuation usefulness are 
alternative objectives of financial accounting. The results of model (9) indicate that 
demand-side related stewardship measures possess explanatory power up-and-above the 
supply-side motivated measure of asymmetric timeliness, while in turn asymmetric 
timeliness still continues to be significantly negatively related with VUSCORE. The only  39 
stewardship measure which is not longer significantly negatively related to VUSCORE 
when all stewardship measures are included is EMPL. Taken together, model (9) clearly 
supports the negative link between stewardship and valuation usefulness: All stewardship 
measures are negatively related to valuation usefulness after controlling for other 
determinants, four out of five significantly so. 
The results of the multivariate analyses can be summed up as follows: Financial 
accounting’s valuation usefulness is predominantly a function of a firm’s informational 
infrastructure and earnings properties. Firms with persistent and smooth earnings and an 
informationally efficient infrastructure have more valuation useful financial accounting 
information, whereas firms in poorer informational infrastructures, firms with higher 
levels of high-transaction-costs stakeholders, and firms that report earnings in an 
asymmetric timely fashion in order to fulfill the stewardship role of financial accounting 
have less valuation-useful financial accounting information in general.  
4  Conclusion 
I conclude that valuation usefulness and stewardship are alternative objectives of 
financial accounting. Based on the results of this paper, for some firms within rich 
information environments, accounting information appears to fulfill predominantly a 
confirmatory role.  This accounting information appears to be more useful in making 
economic decisions related to contracting rather than valuation.  Firms operating in weak 
information environments, however, lack the channels to effectively communicate 
valuation-relevant information by any means other than accounting information.  For 
these firms, accounting information appears to be valuation-useful from a valuation 
perspective.  40 
The results of this study are subject to several limitations.  As far as internal 
validity is concerned, the interpretation of the results relies on the used metrics for 
valuation usefulness and stewardship to succeed in capturing their underlying economic 
concepts.  I try to carefully motivate their use, balance their respective strengths and 
weaknesses, and provide some evidence that they are predictably related with factors, 
which theory suggests should be linked to their underlying concepts.  However, if the 
metrics do not proxy for their underlying economic concepts, the conclusions of the paper 
are not valid.  In addition, I tried to identify additional independent variables that might 
have an impact on the dependent constructs of interest and included these variables in the 
determinant models.  If I failed to include additional variables that are causally related to 
the dependent variables, while being correlated with the independent variables, the 
resulting omitted variables problem would question the validity of the findings.  In 
respect to external validity, this paper addresses only a limited time period of a selected 
national capital market.  While the U.S. market constitutes the largest equity market in 
the world, and the chosen timeframe covers the last 16 years, it is still an empirically 
open question whether the results of this paper extend to other time periods and other 
markets as well. 
Based on these limitations, it is obvious that I leave a lot to future research.  The 
usage of contract-related firm-year specific measures for the relative importance of the 
stewardship role to assess the inter-relatedness of the valuation usefulness and the 
stewardship role of accounting might be an interesting avenue. Another promising area is 
the investigation of the valuation usefulness of financial accounting information on non-
equity markets. Building on the results of this paper about the influence of the  41 
information environment on the role of accounting information it could be interesting to 
explore the firm-specific determinants for the usage of financial accounting information 
by market participants in greater detail. 
From a standard-setting perspective, the results of this paper could contribute to 
the development of the joint conceptual framework. If the Boards decide to adopt their 
broad definition of decision usefulness, every piece of information is decision-useful and 
stewardship as well as valuation usefulness are assumed to be compatible sub-objectives 
of the single overall objective decision usefulness.  However, the results of this paper 
suggest that this broad definition blurs an important difference in the channels by which 
accounting information affects economic relationships.  Thus, stressing the importance of 
this study’s limitations discussed above, I cautiously suggest that the Boards should 
consider explicitly stating that the overall objective of decision usefulness gives rise to 
two alternative sub-objectives, valuation usefulness and stewardship. In doing so, they 
would acknowledge that financial reporting standard setting has to balance these 
alternative objectives of financial reporting. 
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BASd,i  =  difference between daily closing ask and closing bid price from CRSP, 
divided by the average of the closing bid and ask price for date d of firm i. 
Measured in base points. 
CARt,i  =  cumulative abnormal value weighted return from the day prior to the day 
after the Compustat quarterly earnings announcement date for quarter t of 
firm i. 
ΔNIt,i  =  change in Compustat quarterly earnings per share from the quarterly 
earnings per share of the previous year’s same quarter, deflated by the 
closing price per share of the previous year quarter for quarter t of firm i. 
FCEt,i  =  IBES quarterly earnings forecast error, defined as the difference between 
the last summary mean earnings per share forecast and the actual earnings 
per share reported by IBES deflated by the closing price per share of the 
previous year quarter for quarter t of firm i. 
NIt,i  =  Compustat quarterly earnings per share deflated by price per share at the 
beginning of the quarter for quarter t of firm i. 
FFINDUSTRYt,i  =  variable indicating the membership of the firm in one of the ten industry 
groups proposed by Fama/French (1997). 
YEARt  =  yearly fixed effects. 
RETt,i  =  buy and hold return of the quarter t of firm i. 
NEGt,i  =  one if RETt,i < 0 and zero otherwise. 
SIZEi  =  natural logarithm of the market capitalization of equity, averaged over all 
quarterly observations of firm i. 
NUMESTi  =  number of analysts for the most recent quarterly earnings forecast on 
IBES, averaged over all quarterly observations of firm i. 
MTBi  =  market value of equity divided by book value of equity, averaged over all 
quarterly observations of firm i. 
PREDi  =  R² of an AR(4) forecast, regressing earnings per share deflated by price on 
previous quarters’ earnings per share, requiring a minimum of ten 
observations. 
PERSi  =  sum of the AR(1) and AR(4) coefficient from a AR(4) forecast, regressing 
earnings per share deflated by price on previous quarters’ earnings per 
share, requiring a minimum of ten observations.. 
ZRETURNi  =  percentage of trading days without return for firm i, averaged over all 
quarterly observations of firm i. 
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(APPENDIX 1 Continued) 
 
Variable Definition 
Measures of valuation usefulness 
ATOVERi  =  average daily turnover from the day prior to the day after the Compustat 
quarterly earnings announcement date minus the average daily turnover of 
a combined pre and post window, the pre window beginning 30 days and 
ending 5 days prior and the post window beginning 5 days and ending 30 
days post the earnings announcement date. Averaged over all available 
observations of firm i, requiring a minimum of ten observations. 
ΔBASi  =  difference between the average BASd,i from a window beginning 2 days 
and ending 5 days post the quarterly earnings announcement date and the 
average BASd,i from a window beginning 5 days and ending 2 days prior 
the earnings announcement date. Averaged over all available observations 
of firm i, requiring a minimum of ten observations. 
ERCi  = coefficient  α1,i from the regression:  i t i t i i i t NI CAR , , , 1 , 0 , ε α α + Δ + =  over the 
time series of quarterly observations of firm i, requiring a minimum 
number of 10 observations. 
FCERCi  = coefficient  α1,i from the regression:  i t i t i i i t FCE CAR , , , 1 , 0 , ε α α + + =  over the 
time series of quarterly observations of firm i, requiring a minimum 
number of 10 observations. 
VUSCOREi  =  sum of the decile ranks of ATOVERi, -ΔBASi, ERCi, and FCERCi, [0,1] 
distributed. 
VUINDj  =  ranking of the ten industry groups j proposed in Fama/French (1997), 
ranked by their average VUSCOREi, [0,1] distributed. 
Measures of stewardship 
CONSi  =  kink in the regression line of the regression 
i t i t i t i i t i i t i i i t RET NEG RET NEG NI , , , , 3 , , 2 , , 1 , 0 , * ε β β β β + + + + = , calculated in 
degrees as  ) arctan( ) arctan( , 2 , 3 , 2 i i i i CONS β β β − + =  for each firm i, 
requiring a minimum of 10 observations and a minimum of 5 observations 
with NEG equal to one. 
DEBTj  =  average of total debt divided by total assets over the time series of firm i. 
ACC_PAYj  =  average of accounts payable divided by total assets over the time series of 
firm i. 
RENTEXPj  =  average of rental expenses divided by net sales over the time series of  
firm i. 
EMPLj  =  average of employees in thousands divided by net sales in million USD 
over the time series of firm i.  47 
APPENDIX 2: Quarterly Earnings Observations by Year and Industry (Panel Sample) 
 
Year Fama/French  Industry  Total 





Industries  Chemicals Manu-
facturing  Telecom Utilities  Shops  Money  Other   
1990  199 158  97 219  1,269  86  54 741 342 310  3,475  (2.9  %) 
1991  205 178 105 270  1,357  97  56 835 371 347  3,821  (3.2  %) 
1992  244 186 115 388  1,503 114  60  1,054 430 453  4,547  (3.8  %) 
1993  282 214 136 458  1,794 124  64  1,297 532 531  5,432  (4.5  %) 
1994  335 272 150 503  2,094 146  64  1,544 960 560  6,628  (5.5  %) 
1995  369 302 168 517  2,288 150  59  1,761  1,299 617  7,530  (6.3  %) 
1996  413 328 172 581  2,563 162  63  2,109  1,391 663  8,445  (7.1  %) 
1997  399 344 182 687  2,747 188  47  2,413  1,490 725  9,222  (7.7  %) 
1998  388 344 169 795  2,802 186  46  2,568  1,528 793  9,619  (8.0  %) 
1999  376 320 168 782  2,695 182  44  2,572  1,648 770  9,557  (8.0  %) 
2000  348 286 176 803  2,691 261  43  2,699  1,760 782  9,849  (8.2  %) 
2001  307 270 185 854  2,674 246  43  2,550  1,709 753  9,591  (8.0  %) 
2002  292 248 174 824  2,538 236  44  2,474  1,661 727  9,218  (7.7  %) 
2003  275 233 167 795  2,414 219  43  2,329  1,601 704  8,780  (7.3  %) 
2004  258 211 147 757  2,315 210  44  2,139  1,466 657  8,204  (6.8  %) 
2005  183 148 107 551  1,713 148  34  1,533  1,055 471  5,943  (5.0  %) 
4,873 4,042 2,418 9,784  35,457 2,755  808  30,618  19,243 9,863  Total
  (4.1 %)  (3.4 %)  (2.0 %)  (8.2 %)  (29.6 %)  (2.3 %)  (0.7 %)  (25.5 %)  (16.1 %)  (8.2 %) 
119,861 (100 %) 
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TABLE 1: Metrics of Valuation Usefulness 
Panel A: Cross-Sectional Valuation Usefulness Metrics 
Variable  # of Firms  First Quartile  Median  Third Quartile  Mean  Std. Dev. 
ATOVERi  3,425 0.840 2.699*** 5.940 4.207***  4.742 
ΔBASi  3,425 -15.615  -4.484*** 4.298  -5.664***  25.533 
ERCi 3,425  -0.044  0.201*** 0.661  0.443***  1.309 
FCERCi  3,425 0.239 1.969*** 6.840 6.522***  14.025 
VUSCOREi  3,425 0.389 0.500 0.611 0.500 0.176 
Panel B: Correlations (Cross-Sectional Sample) 
Variable ATOVERi  ΔBASi  ERCi FCERCi VUSCOREi 
ATOVERi  -0.021  -0.012  0.250 0.461 
ΔBASi  -0.063   0.003  0.007  -0.421 
ERCi -0.033  -0.013    0.156  0.437 
FCERCi  0.173  -0.014  0.209    0.455 
VUSCOREi  0.531  -0.488 0.522  0.627   
Panel C: Valuation-Usefulness Metric VUSCORE by Industry 
Industry  # of Firms  First Quartile Median  Third Quartile  Mean  Std. Dev
Shops 935  0.417  0.556  (1)  0.667  0.542
a  0.172 
Manufacturing 956 0.417  0.528  (2)  0.639  0.525
a,b  0.170 
Consumer Non Durable  124  0.417  0.528 (2)  0.625  0.518
a,b,c  0.160 
Other 299  0.389  0.500  (4)  0.639  0.514
a,b,c 0.185 
Consumer Durable  102  0.389  0.472 (5)  0.583  0.486
a,b,c,d 0.166 
Telecom 100  0.361  0.444  (6)  0.514  0.445
b,c,d 0.143 
Chemicals 273  0.306  0.417  (8)  0.556  0.438
c,d 0.173 
Money 557  0.306  0.444  (6)  0.556  0.432
d 0.168 
Extracting Industries  61  0.306  0.417 (8)  0.500  0.423
d,e  0.152 
Utilities 18  0.250  0.347  (10)  0.444  0.350
e
  0.142 
 
Notes: ATOVERi is the average abnormal share turnover of firm i over a three day window centered on the 
quarterly earnings announcement date.  ΔBASi is the change in firm i’s average closing bid-ask-spread 
from a window prior to a window post the quarterly earnings announcement date.  ERCi is the coefficient 
of the explantory variable in a regression of the three-day quarterly earnings announcement period’s 
abnormal returns of firm i on the change in quarterly earnings from the same quarter of the previous fiscal 
year.  FCERCi is the coefficient of the explanatory variable in a regression of the three-day quarterly 
earnings announcement period’s abnormal returns of firm i on the IBES based earnings forecast error.  
VUSCORE is the sum of the deciles of ATOVER, -ΔBAS, ERC, and FCERC.  All variables are 1%-
winsorized where appropriate.  See Appendix 1 for more detailed variable definitions.  In Panel A, the 
significance of distribution means against zero is assessed by t-tests (Wilcoxon tests) for means (medians). 
***/**/* marks two-sided significance at the 1/5/10% level.  In Panel B, Pearson are above and Spearman 
correlations are below the diagonal.  Bold typeset indicates two-sided significance below the 1 % level.  In 
Panel C, the superscripts 
a,b,c,d,e indicate that the respective industry groups distributions’ means of 
VUSCOREi are not significantly different from each other at the 1 % level.    49 
TABLE 2: Asymmetric Timeliness as a measure of Stewardship 
Panel A: Cross-Sectional CONS Metric 
Variable  # of Firms  First Quartile  Median  Third Quartile  Mean  Std. Dev. 
CONSi 3,425  -1.318  0.706***  4.082  2.396***  8.609 
Panel B: Portfolio Test of CONS (Panel Sample) 














Coeff.  Lower Deciles of CONS                                                                                                                             Higher Deciles of CONS Trend 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10   
β1  -0.014***  -0.004*** -0.002  -0.002**  0.002**  -0.001  -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.009*** 0.00 
β2  0.024*** 0.011*** 0.001  -0.006** -0.003*  -0.011***  -0.021*** -0.024*** -0.039*** -0.086*** 0.00 
β3  -0.059*** -0.002  0.027*** 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.055***  0.080*** 0.107*** 0.165*** 0.362*** 0.00 
CONSD -3.389  -0.114 1.559 1.928 1.726 3.131 4.582 6.132 9.433  20.356  0.00 
Adj.  R²  0.095 0.082 0.086 0.106 0.166 0.070 0.102 0.092 0.145 0.261  0.07 
n  10,384 12,400 12,735 12,579 12,804 12,226 12,480 11,952 11,742 10,559   
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(TABLE 2 Continued) 
Panel C: Stewardship Metric CONS by Industry 
Industry  # of Firms  First Quartile  Median  Third Quartile  Mean  Std. Dev 
Telecom 100  -1.580  4.968  (1)  14.685  6.835
a  12.775 
Extracting Industries  61  -1.234  1.582 (2)  11.880  4.058
a,b 10.198 
Other 299  -0.957  0.515  (6)  5.711  3.496
a,b 9.671 
Consumer Durable   102  -1.750  1.054 (3)  5.567  3.127
a,b 10.471 
Shops 935  -1.108  0.867  (5)  4.703  2.841
a,b 8.915 
Manufacturing 956  -1.263  0.925  (4)  4.349  2.442
b 8.609 
Consumer Non Durable  124  -1.929  0.293 (8)  3.511  1.935
b 9.492 
Money 557  -1.347  0.187  (9)  2.092  0.885
b,c 6.118 
Chemicals 273  -1.945  0.466  (7)  2.972  0.871
b,c 5.730 
Utilities 18  -9.060  -2.905  (10)  2.180  -2.749
c 9.169 
 
Notes: CONSi is the kink (measured in degrees) of a firm-specific Basu-type regression.  NI is price-
deflated earnings per share, and RET is the buy-and-hold return for the quarter.  NEG is one if RET is 
negative and zero otherwise. YEAR and FFINDUSTRY are year and industry fixed effects, respectively. 
All variables are 1%-winsorized where appropriate.  See Appendix 1 for more detailed variable definitions.  
In Panel A, the significance of distribution means against zero is assessed by t-tests (Wilcoxon tests) for 
means (medians). ***/**/* marks two-sided significance at the 1/5/10% level.  In Panel B, the Panel 
Sample is grouped in deciles according to CONSi and then OLS coefficients of model (4) are estimated for 
each sub sample.  The standard errors used to calculate the significance levels of the coefficients are 
clustered by firm.  CONSD measures the kink in the regression line of model (4) for each sub sample in 
degrees as CONSD=arctan(β2+β3) - arctan(β2).  The significance of the trend in the coefficients across the 
CONS deciles is based on OLS regressions of the coefficients on the ranks. In Panel C, the superscripts 
a,b,c 
indicate that the respective industry groups distributions’ means of VUSCOREi are not significantly 
different from each other at the 1 % level.  51 
TABLE 3: Impact of Valuation Usefulness on Stewardship 
Panel A: Panel Regression Analysis (Panel Sample) 
(5) 
t i i t i t i t i t i i t t t




t t i t
VUSCORE NEG RET NEG RET VUSCORE RET RET
VUSCORE NEG VUSCORE NEG FFINDUSTRY YEAR NI
ε β β β β
β β β δ γ
+ + + +
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= =
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  Panel Sample 
  Estimate Prob. 
NEGt,i -0.004  0.048 
VUSCOREi 0.008  0.001 
NEGt,i*VUSCOREi 0.005  0.101 
RETt,i -0.078  0.000 
RETt,i*VUSCOREi 0.095  0.000 
RETt,i*NEGt,i  0.260 0.000 




Panel B: Out-of-Sample Evidence (Full Sample) 
(6) 
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  Full Sample 
  Estimate Prob. 
NEGt,i 0.002  0.005 
VUINDt,i -0.017  0.000 
NEGt,i*VUINDt,i -0.002  0.189 
RETt,i -0.050  0.000 
RETt,i*VUINDt,i 0.010  0.036 
RETt,i*NEGt,i  0.262 0.000 





Notes: NI is price-deflated earnings per share, and RET is the buy-and-hold return for the quarter.  NEG is 
one if RET is negative and zero otherwise. YEAR and FFINDUSTRY are year and industry fixed effects, 
respectively. VUSCORE is a combined rank measure of the valuation-usefulness measures presented in 
Table 1. VUIND is the industry ranking based on VUSCORE as presented in Table 1. All variables are 1%-
winsorized where appropriate.  See Appendix 1 for more detailed variable definitions.  The coefficients of 
model (5) and (6) are estimated using OLS and the standard errors used to calculate their significance levels 
are clustered by firm. 52 
TABLE 4: Determinants of Valuation Usefulness 
Panel A: Additional Independent Variables 
Variable  # of Firms  First Quartile  Median  Third Quartile  Mean  Std. Dev. 
SIZEi  3,425  4.201 5.051 5.960 5.134 1.298 
NUMESTi  3,425  1.733 2.846 4.900 4.000 3.515 
MTBi  3,425  1.658 2.480 3.972 3.159 2.214 
PREDi  3,425  0.151 0.239 0.349 0.259 0.162 
PERSi 3,425  -0.049  0.150  0.346  0.146  0.286 
ZRETURNi  3,425  0.069 0.123 0.183 0.131 0.076 
Panel B: Correlations (Cross-Sectional Sample) 
Variable NUMESTi MTBi PREDi PERSi ZRETURNi CONSi ATOVERi ΔBASi  ERCi FCERCi VUSCOREi 
SIZEi  0.723 0.340 0.011 0.035  -0.643 -0.051  0.317  0.052 -0.032  0.344 0.178 
  (0.740) (0.361) (0.012) (0.022)  (-0.663) (-0.049)  (0.240)  (0.070) (-0.065)  (0.308)  (0.178) 
NUMESTi   0.330  -0.014 0.029  -0.480  -0.015  0.499  0.041  -0.046 0.337 0.248 
   (0.375)  (0.013) (0.004)  (-0.586)  (-0.025)  (0.471)  (0.041)  (-0.076) (0.302) (0.288) 
MTBi     0.035  -0.021  -0.373  -0.030  0.318  0.038 0.013 0.219 0.149 
      (0.063)  (-0.007)  (-0.450)  (-0.004)  (0.356)  (0.020) (-0.023)  (0.141) (0.201) 
PREDi      0.361 -0.102  0.021 -0.009  0.007  0.091  -0.001 0.031 
       (0.401) (-0.115)  (0.027) -(0.017)  (0.000)  (0.108)  (-0.010) (0.038) 
PERSi      0.029  0.008  -0.043  0.011  0.070  0.018  0.049 
         (0.047)  (0.012) -(0.027)  (0.018)  (0.096) (0.058) (0.050) 
ZRETURNi       -0.003  -0.401  0.056  0.060 -0.243 -0.246 
       (-0.019)  (-0.380)  (0.040)  (0.090) (-0.214) (-0.239) 
CONSi         0.032  0.041  -0.060 -0.076 -0.081 
         (0.062)  (0.017)  (-0.085) (-0.080) (-0.057) 
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Panel C: Cross-sectional Regression Analyses 
(7) 
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(Prob.)   
Estimate 
(Prob.) 
SIZEi -0.658  2.742  0.035  2.217  -0.007 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.245) (0.000) (0.070) 
log(NUMEST)i  0.614 0.088  -0.019 0.550 0.008 
  (0.000) (0.636) (0.043) (0.000) (0.000) 
MTBi  0.236 0.571 0.033 0.705 0.002 
  (0.000) (0.012) (0.005) (0.000) (0.210) 
PREDi -0.550  4.096  0.638  -1.368  -0.012 
  (0.195) (0.161) (0.000) (0.356) (0.537) 
PERSi  -0.526  -0.866 0.196 0.920 0.038 
  (0.027) (0.598) (0.020) (0.270) (0.000) 
ZRETURNi -15.335 58.288  1.402  -2.683  -0.445 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.499) (0.000) 
CONSi  0.397  6.571 -0.408 -4.720 -0.089 
  (0.232) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
R
2  0.404 0.026 0.026 0.167 0.152 
n  3,425  3,425  3,425  3,425  3,425 
 
Notes: ATOVERi is the average abnormal share turnover of firm i over a three day window centered on the 
quarterly earnings announcement date.  ΔBASi is the average change in firm i’s closing bid-ask-spread 
from a window prior to a window post the quarterly earnings announcement date.  ERCi is the coefficient 
of the explanatory variable in a regression of the three-day quarterly earnings announcement period’s 
abnormal returns of firm i of the on the change in quarterly earnings.  FCERCi is the coefficient of the 
explanatory variable in a regression of the three-day quarterly earnings announcement period’s abnormal 
returns of firm i on the IBES based earnings forecast error.  VUSCORE is the sum of the deciles of 
ATOVER, -ΔBAS, ERC, and FCERC.  SIZE is the natural logarithm of average market capitalization.  
NUMEST is the average number of analysts following the firm.  MTB is the average market-to-book ratio.  
PRED is a measure of earnings predictability, the R² coefficient of a AR(4) time-series regression, 
regressing current quarter earnings per share (price-deflated) on prior quarter earnings per share. PERS is a 
measure of earnings persistence, the sum of the AR(1) and AR(4) coefficients from the AR(4) time-series 
regression of current quarter earnings per share on prior periods earnings per share.  ZRETURN is the 
average percentage of trading days with zero returns to the firm. CONS is the firm-specific measure of 
asymmetric timeliness, the kink (measured in degrees) of a firm-specific BASU-type regression and 
FFINDUSTRY is a set of industry fixed effects All variables are 1%-winsorized where appropriate.  See 
Appendix 1 for more detailed variable definitions.  In Panel B, numbers above are Pearson and numbers in 
brackets below are Spearman correlations. Bold typeset indicates two-sided significance below the 1 % 
level.  In Panel C, model (7) is estimated for the cross-sectional sample using OLS. 54 
TABLE 5: Demand-Side Metrics of Stewardship 
Panel A: Cross-Sectional Metrics 
Variable  # of Firms  First Quartile  Median  Third Quartile  Mean  Std. Dev. 
DEBTi  2,978  0.029 0.118 0.262 0.171 0.173 
ΑCC_PAYi  2,978  0.043 0.071 0.117 0.107 0.129 
RENTEXPi  2,978  0.012 0.024 0.047 0.056 0.120 
EMPLi  2,978  0.005 0.007 0.011 0.011 0.016 
Panel B: Correlations (Limited Cross-Sectional Sample) 
Variable  VUSCOREi CONSi ZRETURNi DEBTi ACC_PAYi RENTEXPi EMPLi 
VUSCOREi   -0.103 -0.240 -0.167 -0.071 -0.173 -0.150 
CONSi  -0.080   -0.005  0.121  0.014 -0.019 -0.033 
ZRETURNi  -0.229  -0.016   0.185 0.106  -0.109 0.010 
DEBTi  -0.171 0.059 0.252   -0.037  -0.055  -0.023 
ΑCC_PAYi  -0.011 0.033 0.213 0.111    -0.088 -0.132 
RENTEXPi  -0.117  0.014  -0.193 -0.168 -0.169    0.734 
EMPLi  -0.101  -0.018  0.087 0.055  -0.222 0.498   
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TABLE 5 (Continued) 
Panel C: Cross-sectional Regression Analyses 
(8) 
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SIZEi  0.000 -0.002 -0.007 -0.004 -0.004 
  (0.952) (0.592) (0.101) (0.283) (0.292) 
log(NUMEST)i  0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MTBi  0.001 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.003 
  (0.560) (0.266) (0.009) (0.042) (0.091) 
PREDi -0.007  -0.008  0.006  -0.002  0.008 
  (0.751) (0.718) (0.805) (0.914) (0.720) 
PERSi  0.031 0.033 0.033 0.035 0.032 
  (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) 
ZRETURNi  -0.354 -0.403 -0.472 -0.420 -0.404 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DEBTi  -0.108      -0.100 
  (0.000)      (0.000) 
ACC_PAYi   -0.056      -0.067 
   (0.037)      (0.011) 
RENTEXPi     -0.250    -0.208 
     (0.000)    (0.000) 
EMPLi       -1.398  -0.425 
       (0.000)  (0.126) 
CONSi       - 0 . 0 8 2  
       (0.000) 
R
2  0.133 0.125 0.146 0.138 0.166 
n  2,978  2,978  2,978  2,978  2,978 
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Notes: The limited cross-sectional sample contains all firm observations from the cross-sectional sample 
for which sufficient data are available to calculate the demand-side stewardship metrics.  DEBTi is the 
average of total debt divided by total assets for firm i.  ACC_PAYi is the average of accounts payable 
divided by total assets for firm i.  RENTEXPi is the average of rental expenses divided by net sales for firm 
i.  EMPLi is the average of employees in thousands divided by net sales in million USD for firm i.  All 
variables are based on yearly Compustat data.  VUSCORE is a combined rank measure of the valuation-
usefulness measures presented in Table 1.  SIZE is the natural logarithm of average market capitalization.  
NUMEST is the average number of analysts following the firm.  MTB is the average market-to-book ratio.  
PRED is a measure of earnings predictability, the R² coefficient of a AR(4) time-series regression, 
regressing current quarter earnings per share (price-deflated) on prior quarter earnings per share. PERS is a 
measure of earnings persistence, the sum of the AR(1) and AR(4) coefficients from the AR(4) time-series 
regression of current quarter earnings per share on prior periods earnings per share.  ZRETURN is the 
average percentage of trading days with zero returns to the firm. CONS is the firm-specific measure of 
asymmetric timeliness, the kink (measured in degrees) of a firm-specific BASU-type regression and 
FFINDUSTRY is a set of industry fixed effects All variables are 1%-winsorized where appropriate.  See 
Appendix 1 for more detailed variable definitions.  In the correlations tables of Panel B, Pearson are above 
and Spearman correlations are below the diagonal.  Also in Panel B, bold typeset indicates two-sided 
significance below the 1 % level. In Panel C, models (8) and (9) are estimated for the limited cross-
sectional sample using OLS.  
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